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PRIORITIZING ABORTION ACCESS OVER
ABORTION SAFETY IN PENNSYLVANIA
RANDY BECK
UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA SCHOOL OF LAW

This conference was prompted by the prosecution of Dr. Kermit
Gosnell, who ran an abortion clinic in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Dr.
Gosnell was convicted in May of 2013 of charges arising from the killing of
viable infants born in his clinic, the negligent death of an adult patient, and
the systematic disregard of regulations governing the performance of
abortions in Pennsylvania.1 One question proposed for our consideration is
whether Dr. Gosnell is an “outlier,” a description offered by the National
Abortion Federation following Gosnell’s indictment.2
Presumably, one might want to know whether Gosnell was typical of
abortion providers because it could shed light on contested questions
concerning the justification for new abortion regulations. If Gosnell is
uncharacteristic of abortion providers, one might argue, then his
prosecution does not suggest the need for additional oversight. In this short
essay, on the other hand, I argue that whether or not we can currently
identify more providers like Gosnell, and there may well be some,3 his
dangerous medical practice was a foreseeable consequence of the
unsupervised market for abortion services in which he operated.
Dr. Gosnell was able to routinely violate Pennsylvania law because
Pennsylvania health officials decided access to abortion should be
prioritized over monitoring compliance with regulations designed to ensure
1. Joseph A. Slobodzian, Gosnell Guilty of Three Murder Counts, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER
,May
15,
2013,
available
at
http://articles.philly.com/2013-0515/news/39258185_1_verdict-jury-gosnell-case; Sarah Hoye & Sunny Hostin, Doctor Found
Guilty of First-Degree Murder in Philadelphia Abortion Case, CNN, May 14, 2013, 10:26AM,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/13/
justice/pennsylvania-abortion-doctor-trial/.
2. Press Release, National Abortion Federation, Open Letter to Patients from NAF
President Vicki Saporta: Despite Recent Headlines, Quality Abortion Care is the Norm (Jan. 21,
2011), available at http://www.prochoice.org/news/releases/20110121.html.
3. See Kermit Gosnell is Not an Outlier, SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST, http://www.sbalist.org/negligence (July 24, 2013) (last updated Sep. 11, 2013).
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the safety of abortion procedures. Prioritizing access over safety is an ironic
development in the history of abortion rights activism. A key argument for
recognizing a constitutional right to abortion was that legalization would
promote safety by ensuring that abortions were performed by licensed
medical professionals subject to oversight by the state,4 a premise
undermined by the laissez-faire practices of Pennsylvania officials.
Any concern that oversight of abortion clinics might unnecessarily
restrict access can be adequately addressed through the familiar principle of
general applicability. There should be no question that states can properly
enforce against abortion clinics regulations applied generally to other
medical facilities presenting comparable risks to health.

I
Numerous scandals in recent decades have been attributed to a
combination of greed and lax regulation. A desire for wealth, an
opportunity for profit that entails risks to others, and inattentive government
officials can together produce significant social harm. Commentators have
identified these conditions as root causes of the savings and loan crisis of
the 1980s,5 the Enron scandal,6 and the financial crisis of 2008,7 to name a
few. The investigation and trial of Dr. Gosnell suggest that the same
elements of private avarice and minimal government oversight helped
produce the dangerous clinic that Gosnell operated in Philadelphia.

4. See, e.g., Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. and American
Association of Planned Parenthood Physicians as Amici Curiae supporting Respondents, in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S.113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40) (“Planned
Parenthood believes that since abortion is a medical procedure, it should be governed by the same
rules as apply to other medical procedures in general when performed by properly qualified
physicians with reasonable medical safeguards.”).
5. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Liberalism, Public Virtue and JFK, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893,
898 (1989) (“We face a massive crisis in the savings and loan industry—born of unbridled greed
and creedal belief in deregulation.”).
6. Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis,
19 YALE J. ON REG. 471, 471 (2002) (“[B]oth the California energy crisis and Enron’s collapse
were caused by legislative and administrative failures to design regulatory institutions that
adequately constrained opportunistic behavior.”).
7. Janice Kay McClendon, The Perfect Storm: How Mortgage-Backed Securities, Federal
Deregulation, and Corporate Greed Provide a Wake-Up Call for Reforming Executive
Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 131 (2009); FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES,
at
xv–xxv
(2011),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (conclusions regarding causes of
the financial crisis, focusing on excessive risks taken by profit motivated enterprises and failure of
government regulators to act).
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The grand jury that recommended charges against Gosnell prepared a
lengthy report on his abortion clinic, concluding that the doctor “ran a
criminal enterprise, motivated by greed.”8 A number of features of
Gosnell’s abortion practice seemed designed to maximize his profit margin,
often in ways that increased risks to patients. On the revenue side,
Dr. Gosnell probably brought in tens of millions of dollars over the years
through the performance of abortions. A 2005 price list shows prices
ranging from 330 dollars for aborting a fetus at six to twelve weeks up to
1,625 dollars if the fetus was at twenty-three to twenty-four weeks, the legal
limit for elective abortions under Pennsylvania statutes.9 However,
Gosnell’s competitive advantage in the market for abortion services
consisted of his willingness to perform abortions other clinics would not,
including abortions illegal under the laws of Pennsylvania and surrounding
states:
Gosnell was known as a doctor who would perform abortions at
any stage, without regard for legal limits. His patients came from
several states, including Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North
Carolina, as well as from Pennsylvania cities outside the
Philadelphia area, such as Allentown. He also had many late-term
Philadelphia patients because most other local clinics would not
perform procedures past 20 weeks.10
Employees testified that Gosnell sometimes charged 2,500–3,000
dollars for late-term abortions.11
Based on conservative assumptions, the grand jury estimated that
Gosnell would have taken in 1.8 million dollars a year performing abortions
three nights a week, but “[i]n light of the testimony we heard that Gosnell
performed the really late third-trimester abortions on Sundays, his take was
likely much higher.”12 The grand jury’s estimate did not include revenue
from the extra amounts patients were invited to pay if they wanted higherthan-normal levels of sedation.13 Further, Dr. Gosnell was not particularly
scrupulous about where the money came from. The grand jury found
8. In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury XXIII, Misc. No. 0009901-2008, 23 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
Jan. 14, 2011), available at www.phila.gov/districtattorney/PDFs/GrandJuryWomensMedical.pdf.
9. Id. app. C. (showing that higher prices were charged if the patient was insured).
10. Id. at 27. See also id. at 3 (“Most doctors won’t perform late second-trimester abortions,
from approximately the 20th week of pregnancy, because of the risks involved. And late-term
abortions after the 24th week of pregnancy are flatly illegal. But for Dr. Gosnell, they were an
opportunity. The bigger the baby, the more he charged.”).
11. Id. at 81, 88.
12. Id. at 88.
13. Id. app. C.
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evidence that Gosnell defrauded an insurance company by convincing
another doctor to bill for services performed by Gosnell’s clinic, allowed a
patient to pay for an abortion using her cousin’s insurance card, and
fraudulently tapped a Delaware abortion fund by falsely claiming that
particular patients were from Delaware.14 One employee testified that when
Dr. Gosnell performed second-trimester abortions before the 24-week limit,
he would sometimes manipulate ultrasounds to make the fetus look bigger
so he could charge more.15
On the cost side of the ledger, Dr. Gosnell took a number of steps to
keep the expense of performing abortions low. For instance, he employed
untrained and unqualified personnel who worked for less money:
•

•

•

•

Gosnell “deliberately hired unqualified staff because he could
pay them low wages, often in cash. Most of Gosnell’s
employees who worked with patients had little or no remotely
relevant training or education. Nor did they have any
certifications or licenses to treat patients. Yet they did so
regularly, and without supervision–in violation of
Pennsylvania’s medical practice standards and the law.”16
Untrained and unlicensed staff (including a 16-year-old high
school student) administered drugs to patients without
individualized medical evaluation and then monitored the
medicated patients.17
One of Gosnell’s patients, Karnamaya Mongar, died from
medications administered by unlicensed and untrained staff.18
Dr. Gosnell had been told a year earlier that one of these staff
members “did not know what she was doing and that she
routinely overmedicated patients.”19
Gosnell employed two individuals who had medical training
but had not obtained medical licenses. They were referred to
and acted like “doctors” whether or not Gosnell was present.20

Dr. Gosnell also saved money on equipment and supplies:
•
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

One of the drugs Gosnell’s staff routinely used to sedate

In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 8, at 89, 177.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 117–35.
Id. at 119.
In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 8, at 39–44.
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patients had been out of favor for 10–15 years because safer
alternatives had been developed, but Gosnell preferred the older
drug because it was cheaper.21
Apart from one non-functioning defibrillator, Gosnell’s clinic
did not have the equipment and drugs required under
Pennsylvania law for resuscitation of patients.22
Gosnell’s clinic had one old EKG machine for monitoring
patient heart rate and pulse, but it had not worked for at least
six years.23 Even the death of a patient did not lead Gosnell to
purchase the required equipment.24
The clinic had only one blood pressure cuff.25
“Several workers testified that Gosnell insisted on reusing
plastic curettes, the tool used to remove tissue from the
uteruses, even though these were made for single use only.”26

These cost-saving measures presumably resulted in a relatively high
profit margin on the abortions performed by Gosnell and his unlicensed
staff. Moreover, abortion was only one of Gosnell’s moneymaking
endeavors. Gosnell’s illegal abortion practice came to light when he was
being investigated for running a “prescription mill,” allowing customers to
obtain controlled substances like the narcotic Oxycontin based on
prescriptions pre-signed by the doctor.27

II
Assuming the grand jury was correct that Gosnell was motivated by
financial considerations, it should have been possible to deter some of the
conduct harmful to his patients and the illegal abortions performed in his
clinic. Assuming sanctions were significant enough and the perceived risk
of imposition high enough, Gosnell might have adjusted course to stay on
the right side of Pennsylvania law.28 As it played out, however,
21. Id. at 7, 124–25.
22. Id. at 75–76.
23. Id. at 76.
24. Id. at 92–93.
25. Id. at 76.
26. In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 8, at 49.
27. Id. at 2, 44, 141. See id. at 23, 88 (Gosnell was allegedly among the three top Oxycontin
prescribers in Pennsylvania).
28. David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 100
YALE L.J. 733, 740 (2001) (“The conventional economic model of deterrence assumes that
individuals (and by extension, the entities they compose) have preferences and tastes independent
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Pennsylvania officials gave Gosnell plenty of reason to believe that
noncompliance with the law would be overlooked. Gosnell was the only
doctor at his clinic at the time of a Department of Health (“DOH”)
inspection in 1989.29 That inspection noted that, among other deficiencies,
Gosnell had no nurses on his staff, even though state law required patients
recovering from surgery to be monitored by nurses.30 Gosnell was
nevertheless allowed to continue performing abortions. He was inspected
again in 1992 and 1993, and the failure to hire nursing staff had still not
been corrected.31 The 1993 inspection noted the problem, along with other
violations, but DOH officials later inaccurately recorded that the
deficiencies had been addressed.32 Thus, four years after the DOH noted
Gosnell’s failure to hire nurses to monitor patients recovering from surgery,
Gosnell was allowed to continue performing abortions even though he was
still not in compliance.33
In 1993, with the election of a pro-choice governor, the Pennsylvania
Department of Health abruptly decided to stop performing regular
inspections of abortion clinics.34 Under the revised policy, the DOH did not
visit Gosnell’s clinic for a period of over sixteen years.35 In theory, the new
policy called for inspection of abortion clinics in response to complaints.36
In fact, the DOH did not visit Gosnell’s clinic: when attorneys’ offices
contacted them in connection with malpractice claims, when a pediatrician
complained that multiple teenage patients had been infected at Gosnell’s
clinic with a sexually transmitted parasite, when a twenty-two-year-old
patient died in 2002 due to complications from an abortion Gosnell
performed, when a medical examiner reported that Gosnell had performed
an abortion on a fetus at thirty-weeks’ gestation (well beyond the
Pennsylvania limit of twenty-four weeks), or even when a second patient
of the content of legal prohibitions. Individuals will comply with a legal prohibition if the
expected penalty–the expected cost to them of the violation–will exceed the gain they expect to
derive from the violation. Two variables are relevant in assessing expected penalties: the
magnitude of the formal sanction if the violation is detected (p) and the probability of detection
(pdet), as perceived by the prospective violator.”); David C. Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur:
The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 46 (2013) (“The basic deterrence formula describes a ratio between two
functions: severity of punishment multiplied by risk of imposition, which is itself a function of
risk of detection, certainty of conviction, and swiftness of process, compared to the value of
reward multiplied by probability of success.”).
29. In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 8, at 139–40.
30. Id. at 140.
31. Id. at 140-42.
32. Id. at 140–42.
33. Id. at 142.
34. Id. at 9, 147.
35. In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 8, at 142–43.
36. Id. at 143.
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died in 2009 from an abortion at Gosnell’s clinic.37 The DOH did not return
to Gosnell’s clinic until they were asked to accompany law enforcement
officials investigating prescription drug abuses, and even then DOH
officials grumbled about being “used” by law enforcement and “badgered”
by the District Attorney to shut down Gosnell’s facility.38
It was not just the Pennsylvania Department of Health, but also the state
Board of Medicine, that overlooked or downplayed complaints about
Gosnell’s clinic. In 2001, before any of Gosnell’s patients had died, one of
Gosnell’s former employees informed the Board of Medicine of numerous
problems at the clinic, including the use of unlicensed personnel to
administer anesthesia, the filthy and unsterile conditions at the clinic, and
the absence of licensed nurses to monitor patient recovery.39 A Board
employee conducted a cursory investigation that did not involve a visit to
the clinic or interviews of any of the unlicensed clinic employees, though he
did talk to Gosnell and another doctor who had performed abortions there.40
The Board closed its investigation into the former employee’s allegations
on the same day that it decided not to investigate the death of twenty-twoyear-old patient Semika Shaw following an abortion by Gosnell.41 Nor did
later complaints of malpractice or lack of insurance prompt the Board to
take action with respect to Gosnell’s clinic.42

III
The 1993 Department of Health decision to stop performing regular
inspections of abortion clinics was motivated by pro-choice political
considerations, specifically, the fear that such inspections could result in
“‘putting a barrier up to women’ seeking abortions.”43 Consideration was
given to reinstating the inspections in 1999, but the Department concluded
that “if they did routine inspections, that they may find a lot of these
facilities didn’t meet [the standards for getting patients out by stretcher or
wheelchair in an emergency], and then there would be less abortion

37. Randy Beck, Overcoming Barriers to the Protection of Viable Fetuses, 71 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2014).
38. In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 8, at 152.
39. Id. at 176–77.
40. Id. at 177–78.
41. Id. at 176.
42. Beck, supra note 37. The Philadelphia Department of Health also failed to act on reports
about the unsanitary conditions at Gosnell’s clinic, filed by one of its employees monitoring the
clinic’s participation in a city vaccine program. See id. (manuscript at __).
43. In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 8 at 9, 147.
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facilities, less access to women to have an abortion.”44 The revised DOH
policy effectively prioritized access to abortion over the safety of abortion
facilities and compliance with the requirements of state law.
The decision of Pennsylvania health officials to prioritize abortion
access over abortion safety is ironic in light of the history of pro-choice
activism in this country. Pro-choice historical narratives often emphasize
that many women had access to abortions before the Supreme Court
recognized a constitutional right to abortion in Roe v. Wade, but that the
procedures were frequently performed in unsafe conditions.45 The brief
Planned Parenthood submitted in Roe estimated that about one million
illegal abortions were performed each year, but highlighted the high risk of
death, infection, sterility or other complications that accompanied these
illegal abortions, often performed by non-physicians.46 The Roe Court took
this argument to heart, noting that “[t]he prevalence of high mortality rates
at illegal ‘abortion mills’” supported a state interest in regulating abortion
clinics, particularly later in pregnancy:
The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like
any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that
insure maximum safety for the patient. . . . The prevalence of high
mortality rates at illegal “abortion mills” strengthens, rather than
44. Id. at 147. Sadly, Gosnell’s failure to comply with the requirements concerning
emergency evacuation of patients contributed to the death of a patient named Karnamaya Mongar.
Id. at 77 (“Another violation of Pennsylvania law proved significant the night Karnamaya Mongar
died: Clinics must have doors, elevators, and other passages adequate to allow stretcher-borne
patients to be carried to a street-level exit. Gosnell’s clinic, with its narrow, twisted passageways,
could not accommodate a stretcher at all. And his emergency street-level access was bolted with
no accessible key. Any chance Mongar had of being revived was hampered by the time wasted
looking for keys to the door.”).
45. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 (“The prevalence of high mortality rates at illegal ‘abortion mills’
strengthens . . . the State’s interest in regulating the conditions under which abortions are
performed.”).
46. Supra note 4. According to this brief:
It has been estimated that about one million illegal abortions are performed each year.
While some of these illegal abortions are performed by physicians, the often tragic
consequences of clandestine abortions, many of them self-induced, or performed by
non-physicians, have created a serious state and national health problem. The most
serious consequence of bungled illegal abortion is, of course, the death of the pregnant
woman. It is estimated that abortion-related mortality is under-reported by as much as
fifty percent. Earlier estimates were that between 5,000 and 10,000 women died each
year because of bungled illegal abortions. However, the number of deaths from criminal
abortion has decreased in recent years as a result of several factors including the advent
of antibiotics, so that a figure of 500 to 1,000 such deaths per year is probably a more
reliable national estimate. Despite the fact that the death rate from illegal abortion has
decreased, the adverse side effects of such abortions, including severe infection,
permanent sterility or other serious complications are still epidemic.
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weakens, the State’s interest in regulating the conditions under
which abortions are performed. Moreover, the risk to the woman
increases as her pregnancy continues. Thus, the State retains a
definite interest in protecting the woman’s own health and safety
when an abortion is proposed at a late stage of pregnancy.47
Planned Parenthood takes the position that promoting the safety of
abortion procedures is the key benefit of the Roe decision: “The most
important benefit [of Roe] was the end of an era that supported the
proliferation of ‘back alley butchers’ who were motivated by money alone
and performed unsafe, medically incompetent abortions that left many
women dead or injured.”48
Planned Parenthood may be correct that legal abortions tend to be safer
than the illegal abortions performed in the years before Roe. But if so, this
is in large part a function of government oversight of the persons and
facilities offering abortion services. In Pennsylvania, where government
officials adopted a hands-off policy regarding abortion clinics, the result
was Dr. Gosnell’s clinic, where two patients lost their lives, countless
others were subjected to high risk medical procedures, and hundreds of
viable fetuses and newborn infants were killed in violation of Pennsylvania
law.

IV
The Gosnell grand jury recommended that abortion clinics in
Pennsylvania be inspected and regulated in the same manner as other
facilities offering comparable surgical procedures: “We recommend that the
Pennsylvania Department of Health plug the hole it has created for abortion
clinics. They should be explicitly regulated as ambulatory surgical facilities,
so that they are inspected annually and held to the same standards as all
other outpatient procedure centers.”49 This idea of subjecting abortion
clinics to generally applicable regulations was endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, where the Court
acknowledged that “[a] State necessarily must have latitude in adopting

47.
48.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 150.
Medical and Social Health Benefits Since Abortion was Made Legal in the U.S.,
PLANNED
PARENTHOOD
(Jan.
2013),
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/PPFA/Medical_Social_
Benefits_Abortion.pdf.
49. In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 8, at 16.
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regulations of general applicability in this sensitive area.”50
General applicability is a test that has often been employed in contexts
where courts are concerned with preventing excessive regulation targeted at
particular persons or activities. An early example can be found in
McCulloch v. Maryland, where the Court struck down a Maryland tax that
targeted the operations of a federally-chartered bank, but indicated that its
decision would not prevent collection of “a tax paid by the real property of
the bank, in common with the other real property within the state, nor to a
tax imposed on the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this
institution, in common with other property of the same description
throughout the state.”51 The Court was concerned that Maryland might be
tempted to use targeted taxes to cripple the federal bank, perhaps as a favor
to its own state-chartered banks,52 but presumably thought this risk was
minimized in the context of a generally applicable tax on real estate or stock
holdings that applied to Maryland citizens and and did not single out noncitizens. Similar strategies have been deployed in other contexts. For
instance, the federal government has been prevented from adopting
regulations that commandeer state officials,53 but it has been permitted to
subject states to regulations that apply generally to large employers.54
Governments may not target religious conduct for regulation,55 but the
Court has decided that the Free Exercise Clause permits application of
generally applicable laws to religious individuals.56 Likewise, even though
the Free Press Clause might protect news organizations from being singled
out for regulation, they must comply with generally applicable rules that
bind a broad array of citizens.57
50. 462 U.S. 416, 434 (1983). The Court in Akron struck down as medically excessive an
ordinance requiring all second-trimester abortions to be performed in a hospital. Id. However, the
Court seemed receptive to the idea that abortion clinics performing second-trimester abortions
could be subjected to minimum standards applicable to “free standing surgical facilities.” Id. at
437.
51. 17 U.S. 316, 436 (1819).
52. Id. at 432.
53. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 186–87 (1992).
54. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56 (1985) (holding that
Congress could apply Fair Labor Standards Act to local transit employees); Reno v. Condon, 528
U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (upholding statute regulating use of personal data concerning drivers where
it was generally applicable in that it applied to both public and private vendors of such
information).
55. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
56. Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
57. Compare Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 592–93 (1983) (striking down tax on paper and ink that only applied to some press
organizations), with Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (newspaper could be
sued under generally applicable theory of promissory estoppel where it allegedly breached
promise of confidentiality made to a source).
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For many forms of health regulation, this general applicability principle
could be deployed to promote the safety of abortion procedures, particularly
in the second trimester, when the risks of abortion increase significantly.58
The fact that a particular regulation is applied to a range of different
outpatient facilities, not just abortion clinics, would give courts confidence
that the regulation was genuinely designed to promote patient health. At the
same time, subjecting abortion clinics to the regime of inspections and
enforcement applicable to other surgical facilities would give patients
confidence that public health officials were not sacrificing abortion safety
in the pursuit of abortion access.

V
The experience in Pennsylvania leading up to the prosecution of Dr.
Gosnell underlines the critical role played by public health officials in
protecting the health of women undergoing abortions, as well as the lives of
the unborn and the newborn. The willingness of public officials to
vigorously enforce the laws governing abortion will play a significant role
in determining whether Dr. Gosnell is in fact an outlier.

58. Linda A. Bartlett et al., Risk Factors for Legal Induced Abortion-Related Mortality in the
United States, 103 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 729, 729 (2004) (“Compared with women
whose abortions were performed at or before 8 weeks of gestation, women whose abortions were
performed in the second trimester were significantly more likely to die of abortion-related
causes.”).

